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THE FEDERAL RESERVE: A STUDY IN 
SOFT CONSTRAINTS 
KATHRYN JUDGE 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression, the 
Federal Reserve (the Fed) took a number of unprecedented steps to try to 
minimize the adverse economic consequences that would follow. From 
providing liquidity injections to save companies like Bear Stearns and 
American International Group (AIG) to committing to a prolonged period of 
exceptionally low interest rates and buying massive quantities of longer-term 
securities to further reduce borrowing costs, the Fed’s response to the 2007 
through 2009 financial crisis (the Crisis) has been creative and aggressive. These 
actions demonstrated that the Fed is uniquely powerful among federal agencies, 
and its authority is even greater than most had previously appreciated.1 They 
also made clear that the Fed’s actions can have significant distributional 
consequences, in addition to affecting the health of the overall economy.2 These 
developments have led many to suggest that the Fed should be far more 
accountable, or less powerful, than it currently is.3 
Attacks on the Fed’s power are not new. Vesting so much power in the 
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 1.  ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, 
AND THE WORK AHEAD 348 (2013) (noting that “even Barney Frank, as smart and knowledgeable a 
member of Congress as there was, expressed surprise to learn that the Fed has an essentially unlimited 
pocketbook”); Nicholas Lemann, The Hand on the Lever: How Janet Yellen is redefining the Federal 
Reserve, THE NEW YORKER, July 21, 2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/ 
21/the-hand-on-the-lever (“There is an old saw that the Chair of the Fed is the second most powerful 
person in government. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, that may actually be an 
understatement.”).  
 2.  See infra Part II.C.  
 3.  E.g., Memorandum from the Fin. Services Comm. Majority Staff to the Members of the 
Comm. on Fin. Services 3–5 (Sept. 6, 2013) (http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
091113_mpt_memo.pdf); RON PAUL, END THE FED 141–48 (2009); John H. Cochrane, The Danger of 
an All-Powerful Federal Reserve, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2013, at A15; see also Michael D. Bordo, Could 
the United States have had a better central bank? An historical counterfactual speculation 34 J. 
MACROECONOMICS 597 (2012); George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes & Lawrence H. White, Has the 
Fed Been a Failure? 34. J. MACROECONOMICS 569 (2012).  
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hands of an unelected few inevitably raises questions about legitimacy, for 
which there are no easy answers. Using traditional mechanisms to make the Fed 
more politically accountable could substantially impede the Fed’s capacity to 
achieve the aims assigned to it.4 Yet, as reflected in the demise of the First and 
Second Banks of the United States, ignoring these concerns can prove even 
more detrimental. In the United States, the outer limits of independence are 
delineated by the Constitution,5 but important questions regarding legitimacy 
and accountability arise far shy of the Constitution’s outer bounds. Many of 
these issues are not specific to the Fed, and there is a robust body of literature 
examining these dynamics.6 Nonetheless, this article suggests that many of the 
forces that influence the degree of independence that the Fed enjoys in practice 
are largely overlooked in much of this literature. 
Those overlooked forces are “soft constraints,” a range of forces that are 
not legally binding and that can even be a little fuzzy in application, but that 
nonetheless impose meaningful limits on how the Fed exercises its seemingly 
vast authority.7 This article illustrates the power of soft constraints by examining 
the role that two particular soft constraints—principled norms and the Fed 
Chair’s concern with her reputation—have played in shaping Fed action over 
the last hundred years. 
Principled norms are guidelines regarding how the Fed ought to act in a 
given set of circumstances. They are “principled” not because they are 
necessarily right or righteous, but because they derive their normative weight 
from a widespread perception that the quality of the Fed’s decisionmaking will 
be enhanced if it adheres to the guidelines embodied in the principled norm. To 
illustrate their operation and explore their limits, this article examines three 
principled norms: (1) the real bills doctrine, which played a critical role shaping 
Fed policy from its 1913 founding through 1935; (2) the Taylor Rule, a formula 
proposed by Stanford economist John Taylor for setting interest rates in a way 
that balances the Fed’s dual aims of promoting full employment and 
maintaining stable prices; and (3) Bagehot’s dictum, a set of guidelines 
proposed by Walter Bagehot in the nineteenth century regarding how a lender 
 
 4.  See infra Part II.A. 
 5.  See, e..g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (2010). 
 6.  E.g., Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 42–64 (2010); Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 93–94 (1994); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of 
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 612–15, 631 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 492, 
499–500 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability]; Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of 
Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1168–81 (2013). 
 7.  These characteristics distinguish the types of constraints here at issue from the more law-like 
conventions that Adrian Vermeule suggests also merit further attention and from many of the informal 
mechanisms of Fed independence identified by Peter Conti-Brown, although there is meaningful 
overlap. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1165; Peter Conti-Brown, The Structure of Federal Reserve 
Independence 42 (Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series No. 139, 
2013). For further discussion, see infra Part I.A. 
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of last resort should respond to liquidity shortages. 
The second soft constraint this paper considers is the reputation of the Chair 
of the Federal Reserve (the Fed Chair). The Fed Chair often serves a lengthy 
term, exercises significant control over Fed activity while in office, and is a focal 
point, both during and after her tenure, for analyses of the Fed’s actions during 
her reign.8 These dynamics both shape the incentives facing a Fed Chair, as the 
effects of the Fed’s actions directly impact her reputation and enable her to 
influence Fed action in light of her reputational concerns. 
These are not the only soft constraints that influence the Fed’s 
policymaking, but they are two of the most important. Two additional benefits 
of focusing on these particular constraints are that they operate in quite distinct 
ways, and thus reflect the range of soft constraints that can affect agency action, 
and they illustrate how soft constraints can interact with one another. For 
example, when the Fed pursues a course of action that is contrary to a 
principled norm, it invites scrutiny. Such actions thus tend to have a greater 
effect on the reputation of a Fed Chair than policies that adhere to an 
established norm. This can provide an added incentive to comply with 
principled norms, but it can also provide a mechanism for incenting a Fed Chair 
to deviate from an established norm when changed circumstances or new 
information suggest that adherence would have undesirable consequences. 
By demonstrating the capacity of soft constraints to shape Fed action, 
improve transparency, and facilitate oversight and discussion, this article 
suggests that the Fed is far less unbridled than many of its critics contend. This 
by no means resolves the pressing concerns about whether the Fed is 
sufficiently accountable in light of the massive power that it wields, but it does 
highlight the importance of developing a descriptively accurate account of the 
problem before seeking to solve it, and it contributes to the project of building 
such an account. 
This article also contributes to the literature on agency accountability and 
independence. In recent years, a growing number of administrative law scholars 
have suggested that agency independence is best understood as a point along a 
continuum rather than as a dichotomous term of art. Nonetheless, these 
scholars have tended to focus on formal constraints on an agency’s autonomy in 
determining where along this spectrum a particular agency lies. This article 
demonstrates the importance of adding soft constraints to the range of factors 
relevant to this determination. It shows that soft constraints can enhance 
legitimacy by improving the quality of decisions an agency makes and by 
reducing the likelihood of arbitrary action. The analysis further suggests that, in 
settings where formal constraints may undermine the ability of an agency to 
achieve its statutorily mandated aims, soft constraints may play a critical role in 
promoting accountability without excessively hindering efficacy. 
This article proceeds in two parts. The first part examines how principled 
 
 8.  See infra Part I.B. 
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norms and the reputation of the Fed Chair constrain Fed activity. In addition to 
demonstrating the power of principled norms, each example also sheds light on 
the processes through which principled norms gain and lose influence, and some 
collateral consequences of their power. The second part addresses some 
implications of this analysis. It suggests that soft constraints may enhance the 
Fed’s legitimacy and merit a place in discussions of agency independence more 
generally. It further argues that soft constraints may be particularly important in 
the context of the Fed and in other environments where short-term political 
accountability may undermine the agency’s capacity to achieve socially valuable 
aims. 
II 
SOFT CONSTRAINTS 
There are a wide range of soft constraints that shape Fed action. For 
example, the efficacy of Fed policymaking depends in significant part on its 
credibility. One of the “tools” that the Fed has employed to promote 
investment in the period following the Crisis has been a commitment to 
maintain low interest rates.9 Because the Fed has no legally enforceable 
obligation to act in accordance with its previous statements, it is the Fed’s 
reputation for doing so that enables its statements (and not just its actions) to 
affect market activity. The Fed is aware of this and the importance of its 
credibility, and it acts accordingly. Similarly, the Fed’s policymaking is often 
shaped and constrained by international obligations, including rules 
promulgated by international organizations and the need to work with foreign 
central banks in order to achieve certain policy objectives. This part thus seeks 
to illustrate, rather than exhaust, the soft constraints on the Fed’s activities. It 
focuses on just two—albeit two of the more important—constraints, and it also 
shows how they interact with one another, at times functioning as complements 
and at other times pulling in different directions. 
A. Principled Norms 
Norms denote a range of social conventions that shape behavior. Many 
norms are straightforward in application, even if sensitive to context. In Japan, 
individuals remove their shoes upon entering a home; in Spain, they keep them 
on. Location determines the appropriate course of action.10 The same can be 
true for norms regarding the operation of federal agencies. For example, 
 
 9.  Frederic S. Mishkin, Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis 25 (Nat. Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16755, 2011) [hereinafter Mishkin, Lessons from the Crisis], 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res2/pdf/fm.pdf; see also Frederic S. 
Mishkin & Michael Woodford, In Defense of the Fed’s New Interest-Rate Policy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 
2013, at A13 (stating that the Fed’s policy to keep rates low, based on clarified unemployment and 
short-term inflation thresholds, is a way that the Fed “can loosen current financial conditions”). 
 10.  For further information about how norms operate and the interactions between norms and 
law, see ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 145 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of 
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 958–61 (1995). 
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Adrian Vermeule has noted that there is no statute preventing the President 
from firing the Fed Chair, yet there is a clearly established norm that effectively 
denies the President such authority.11 This is but one of a number of norms that 
rise to the level of “conventions,” in Vermeule’s parlance, which constitute the 
“operating rules of independence in the administrative state.”12 Similarly, Peter 
Conti-Brown has identified a range of “environmental mechanisms,” including 
conventions and institutional practices that undergird the Fed’s independence.13 
The norms at issue here tend to be fuzzier than the forces examined by these 
and other scholars in a number of ways. They are defined, first and foremost, by 
what they are not—binding legal rules that dictate how the Fed must act or 
cannot act.14 Nonetheless, they are guidelines to which the Fed frequently 
adheres and they typically display a number of common characteristics. First, 
although many principled norms aspire to operate in a rule-like fashion, they 
often fail in this regard. As a result, how the type of norms at issue here applies 
to a particular set of circumstances is often not self-evident, at least to a lay 
observer. Second, although deviation may lead to retribution or reputational 
damage, the degree of force backing the norm tends to be relatively soft, 
making it costly, but not unfathomable, for an agency to act contrary to the 
norm.15 
A distinct issue is that Fed action may conform to a principled norm either 
because of its status as a norm or because it embodies a principle that Fed 
officials believe to be correct. There is no way for outside observers to 
distinguish, and the examples below suggest both forces often operate 
simultaneously to increase the likelihood of compliance. In light of the 
imperfect overlap with existing notions, this article uses the term “principled 
norms” for the types of constraints here at issue. The remainder of this part 
examines the operation of three principled norms—the real bills doctrine, the 
Taylor Rule, and Bagehot’s dictum—to demonstrate the influence of principled 
norms on Fed policymaking, as well as the processes through which principled 
norms gain and lose force. The descriptions of each of these norms, and the 
roles that they play, are somewhat stylized to focus the analysis. 
 
 11.  Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1166. 
 12.  Id. at 1167. 
 13.  Conti-Brown, supra note 7, at 3. 
 14.  By drawing attention to the power of principled norms to meaningfully constrain Fed activity, 
despite operating through mechanisms that allow some flexibility when the situation warrants, this 
article suggests that there may be a viable middle ground in the long-simmering debate on whether the 
Fed should be forced to adhere to rules or whether it should exercise discretion in its policymaking. See, 
e.g., Benjamin M. Friedman, Rules Versus Discretion at the Federal Reserve System: On to the Second 
Century, 24 J. MACROECONOMICS 608 (2012); John B. Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in 
Practice, 39 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. ON PUB. POL’Y 195, 202 (1993) [hereinafter Taylor, 
Discretion Versus Policy Rules].  
 15.  For similar reasons, this article does not refer to the referenced constraints as “rules,” though 
at least one has been given that label by economists. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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1. Real Bills Doctrine 
The real bills doctrine informed the Fed’s policymaking from its founding 
through the Great Depression, though its roots go back much further.16 The 
core idea is that a central bank should lend only against short-term commercial 
bills of trade. Proponents believed that if a central bank provides credit only 
when secured with collateral used for commercial purposes, the central bank 
would support only real economic activity, not speculation.17 More importantly, 
it would thus encourage banks to do the same.18 An additional benefit is that 
any assets the Fed accepted as collateral would be self-liquidating, ensuring that 
the effects of the Fed’s actions would automatically dissipate in time.19 This led 
to the belief that, so long as the Fed adhered to the doctrine, it need not 
otherwise worry about monetary supply.20 Another factor operating in favor of 
the real bills doctrine was the belief that adherence to it would constrain the 
Fed’s exercise of its authority, a matter of great concern to Congress when it 
approved the formation of the Fed.21 It was reflected accordingly, albeit in a way 
that allowed flexibility, in the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913.22 
The importance of the real bills doctrine and its role in shaping the degree 
of discretion Congress vested in the Fed is reflected in the debate over a 1926 
proposal to amend the Federal Reserve Act to impose more formal constraints 
on the Fed’s authority. The proposed bill would have formally authorized the 
Fed to engage in open market operations, an activity only indirectly 
contemplated by the Federal Reserve Act, but the primary aim of the bill was to 
constrain Fed discretion by making price stability the Fed’s sole objective.23 
Three figures—two Mr. Strongs and a Mr. Miller—represented the three 
 
 16.  See Thomas M. Humphrey, The Real Bills Doctrine, 68 ECON. REV. 3, 3–4, 6–8 (1982), 
available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_review/1982/pdf/er680501.pdf.   
 17.  Charles W. Calomiris, Volatile Times and Persistent Conceptual Errors: U.S. Monetary Policy 
1914–1951 11 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 26097, 2010), available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2010/11/22/CalomirisMonetaryPolicyNovember2010.pdf. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 12. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See 1 ALLAN H. MELTZER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 22 (2003) [hereinafter 
Meltzer, Volume 1] (identifying the real bills doctrine as one of three core principles “accepted as basic 
at the start of the Federal Reserve System”); id. at 70 (noting that “[a]uthority to discount real bills was 
seen by many at the time as the main improvement of the new legislation,” that is, the version that was 
the basis for the Federal Reserve Act that was eventually adopted); Perry Mehrling, Economists and 
the Fed: Beginnings, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 207, 209 (2002) (stating that a reason for the passage of the 
Federal Reserve Act “was the rhetorical success of the ‘real bills doctrine’”).   
 22.   The original Federal Reserve Act provided the Fed and member banks significant discretion, 
including the power to set the discount rate, while providing that such “rates . . . shall be fixed with a 
view of accommodating commerce and business.” Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 14, 
38 Stat. 251,264 (1913); see also Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 729 (noting that “[t]he original 
Federal Reserve Act wrote the real bills doctrine into law”).  
 23.  Robert L. Hetzel, The Rules Versus Discretion Debate Over Monetary Policy in the 1920s, 71 
ECON. REV. 3, 3 (1985), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/ 
economic_review/1985/pdf/er710601.pdf (noting that B. Strong “dominated monetary policy in the 
1920s through the force of his personality”).  
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positions relevant to the analysis here. The first Strong was Kansas 
Representative James Strong who introduced the bill. The second was 
Benjamin Strong, then-Chair of the New York Fed and widely regarded as one 
of the most influential figures in the early Fed.24 The final figure, Adolph Miller, 
was a member of the Washington, D.C.–based Federal Reserve Board, which at 
that time enjoyed significantly less power than it does today. Benjamin Strong 
and Miller both opposed the bill, but for very different reasons. 
Miller and other members of the Federal Reserve Board believed that the 
Strong bill relied upon fundamentally incorrect assumptions about the authority 
of the Fed to use open market operations and their capacity to affect price 
levels. Motivated by a version of the real bills doctrine, Miller believed that the 
discount rate (the rate the Fed charges when it loans money to a bank through 
its discount window) should be the primary tool used by the Fed, and that it 
should be set with regard to the degree of banks’ speculative activity.25 This 
camp further believed that the Fed’s discretion was already significantly 
constrained by virtue of the real bills doctrine and indirect reference to it in the 
original Federal Reserve Act.26 
Benjamin Strong, by contrast, believed that the real bills doctrine was 
fundamentally flawed. He recognized that credit, once obtained, could be used 
by a bank to fund loans or engage in whatever other activity it expected to yield 
the highest return irrespective of the type of collateral used to secure the 
credit.27 As a result, the real bills doctrine would not effectively prevent banks 
from engaging in speculation. Strong had also come to appreciate that open 
market operations, in which the Fed bought and sold securities, thereby 
affecting the amount of high-powered money in the financial system, could be 
an important tool for the Fed to utilize in its operations.28 He opposed the 
Strong bill because of its mandate regarding price stability. Specifically, Strong 
was concerned about the imprecise nature of the Fed’s control over prices, the 
risk that the Fed might be pressured to use its control over prices to serve aims 
other than price stability, and that the constraint may prevent the Fed from 
pursuing other legitimate aims.29 
The bill did not pass, but Congressman Strong’s rationale for proposing the 
bill illustrates that concerns about Fed accountability are not new.30 Similarly, 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.at 3–4, 9–11; id. at 9 (“The characteristic of the good functioning of the credit system is to be 
found in the promptness and in the degree with which the flow of credit adapts itself to the orderly flow 
of goods in industry and trade.”) (quoting 10 FED. RESERVE BD. ANN. REP. 34-S (1924)); see also 
Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 53 (noting that the Federal Reserve Board was dominated 
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s by advocates of the real bills doctrine).  
 26.  Id. at 12–13 (quoting in part Stabilization: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 70th Cong. 252 (1928) (statement of Adolph Miller, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd.)). 
 27.  Id. at 3–5. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.; see also Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 273. 
 30.  Hetzel, supra note 23, at 13 (quoting Stabilization, Part 1: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 69th Cong. 569 (1926) (statement of Rep. James G. Strong)).  
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the different rationales for opposing the bill reflect both the challenges that 
arise when one tries to constrain the Fed’s authority through traditional 
mechanisms and the possibility that the Fed’s authority is more constrained 
than it seems. It was precisely because the Federal Reserve Act inadvertently 
provided the Fed with a powerful tool—the ability to engage in open market 
operations—that Benjamin Strong could take actions generally viewed as 
having very positive effects. Put differently, flexibility in the Act enabled Strong 
to respond when faced with changed circumstances and new insights about the 
power of open market operations to impact economic activity.31 Yet, in the view 
of Miller and others at the Federal Reserve Board, their authority was already 
quite constrained even if the statutory scheme had significant wiggle room in it. 
They viewed themselves as bound to act in accord with the real bills doctrine, 
despite flexibility in the statutory scheme, and they understood it to be more 
constraining than the proposed bill. Moreover, although there was some 
variation, most of the actions taken by the Board and the regional reserve 
banks during this time adhered to the real bills doctrine.32 
Unfortunately, this story does not have a happy ending. Although the real 
bills doctrine appears to have been effective in constraining how the Fed used 
its authority, the country likely would have been better served had it been less 
effective in this regard. Many economists today view adherence to the real bills 
doctrine as a significant factor contributing to the Fed’s failure to respond more 
aggressively and effectively to mitigate the Great Depression.33 There is ongoing 
controversy regarding the magnitude of the role it played, and whether 
Benjamin Strong would have pursued a different course had he not passed away 
in 1928.34 Regardless of what alternative scenarios may have looked like, the 
evidence suggests that the real bills doctrine played a meaningful role in 
constraining how the Fed understood and used its discretion, illustrating the 
power of principled norms to shape Fed action. 
 
 31.  Despite his stated position and the position taken by many academics that, had Strong 
survived, the course of the Depression may have looked very different, other studies suggest that 
Strong’s policies actually tended to conform to the real bills doctrine. Calomiris, supra note 17, at 13–14 
and sources cited therein. 
 32.  Id. and sources cited therein; cf. John. H. Wood, Monetary policy and the Great Depression 
(Working Paper, 2008) available at http://users.wfu.edu/jw/ (reviewing the studies and other literature 
suggesting that the real bills doctrine played a significant role shaping the Fed’s actions during this 
period and the arguments and evidence to the contrary). 
 33.  Calomiris, supra note 18, at 14; William Troost & Gary Richardson, Monetary Intervention 
Mitigated Banking Panics During the Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal 
Reserve District Border, 1929–1933, 117 J. POL. ECON. 1031, 1040–68 (2009); Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at “The First 100 Years of the Federal Reserve: The Policy 
Record, Lessons Learned, and Prospects for the Future,” conference sponsored by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20100103a.htm (recognizing that the magnitude of the role played by various factors remains 
contested, but identifying the real bills doctrine as among those forces that likely contributed to the 
Fed’s failure during this period).   
 34.  See, e.g., Calomiris, supra note 18, at 13 (suggesting that Strong’s policies actually tended to 
conform to the real bills doctrine); Wood, supra note 32 (describing the debate about the role the real 
bills doctrine played).  
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The debate over the Strong bill also illustrates a second function of 
principled norms—that they can serve as reference points that facilitate 
oversight and debate. This is one way that principled norms may complement, 
and thereby enhance the efficacy of, traditional tools used to hold agencies 
accountable. 
In addition to illustrating the power of principled norms and the costs that 
arise when an erroneous principled norm becomes influential, the evolving 
influence of the real bills doctrine illustrates the processes through which such 
norms can be displaced, and how these norms can influence learning. Even at 
the founding of the Fed, the real bills doctrine had powerful critics, so the 
presence of critical voices, even influential and informed ones, does not seem to 
suffice.35 The influence of Benjamin Strong cuts in multiple directions. On one 
hand, it suggests that when an influential policymaker holds beliefs contrary to 
a principled norm, that policymaker can use his position to promote action in 
accordance with his distinctive beliefs, perhaps facilitating a weakening of the 
guideline as a principled norm. On the other hand, it is possible that members 
of the Board, threatened by Strong’s influence, became even greater advocates 
of the real bills doctrine in order to legitimize their position and protect their 
power. Members of Congress and other critics of a particular Fed policy may 
similarly invoke principled norms to enhance or detract from the legitimacy of 
policies or individuals supporting them (for reasons quite apart from the 
merits), complicating the process through which principled norms take hold and 
erroneous norms are discredited. 
A related challenge is the impact of principled norms on learning. As 
reflected in the debate over the Strong bill, many of the Fed officials who were 
making decisions consistent with the real bills doctrine were doing so, at least in 
part, because they believed it embodied the best policy for the Fed to follow. 
This belief not only prevented the Fed from acting more aggressively to prevent 
the depths of the Great Depression; it also inhibited the capacity of many Fed 
officials to appreciate even after the fact that there was more that they could 
have done.36 In part because of this, it took decades for academics and 
policymakers to appreciate many of the core lessons that the Depression held 
for central bank policymaking. This suggests another effect of having a 
principled norm that has achieved widespread acceptance—it can retard 
learning and prevent experimentation, leading experts to fine-tune an 
established norm when it would be more productive to question its fundamental 
accuracy.37 If policymakers and others come to appreciate the capacity of 
 
 35.  Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 53, 64. 
 36.  See id. at 411 (noting “that most of the governors accepted the real bills doctrine” and 
“Federal Reserve officials were not alone in their acceptance”); id. at 729 (noting that, in addition to 
members of the Federal Reserve, “[e]conomists, bankers, congressional leaders, and many others 
accepted the theory and believed the Federal Reserve was right to follow it”); Calomiris, supra note 18, 
at 18 (discussing the Fed’s slow learning process as contributing to conceptual errors in policymaking).  
 37.  Ricardo J. Caballero, Macroeconomics After the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of-
Knowledge Syndrome, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 85 (2010).  
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principled norms to shape Fed action, it may be worthwhile to investigate 
whether it is possible to improve the processes through which such norms rise 
and fall. For purposes of this article, the analysis here suffices to establish the 
relevant point: Adherence to a principled norm, the real bills doctrine, 
meaningfully shaped Fed action before and during the Great Depression. Its 
influence was incomplete—Strong arguably disregarded it and there were no 
formal mechanisms through which he could be called to task for doing so—but 
it was powerful nonetheless. 
2. The Taylor Rule 
The Taylor Rule provides a formula for setting the federal funds rate (the 
fed funds rate)—the target rate for overnight, interbank loans—by reference to 
“the deviation of inflation from its desired level or target (the inflation gap) and 
the deviation of output from its natural rate level (the output gap).”38 As a 
result, it provides a guide for how the Fed should set the fed funds rate to 
balance its dual aims of maintaining stable prices and promoting full 
employment. First articulated by Stanford economist John Taylor in 1993, the 
equation was designed, as the name suggests, to be a rule and thus 
straightforward in its application.39 
In proposing the Rule, Taylor demonstrated that the fed funds rate that the 
rule called for mapped relatively cleanly onto the Fed’s then-recent monetary 
policies.40 In this sense, it may be viewed as having largely descriptive origins.41 
Subsequent studies revealed that during the 1960s and 1970s, central banks 
often failed to adhere to the Taylor Rule, and this likely contributed to the rise 
in inflation that followed.42 In contrast to the real bills doctrine, many of the 
studies invoking the Taylor Rule examine Fed policy in periods prior to its 
introduction. Because these analyses tended to suggest that the Fed acted in 
conformity with the Rule during periods subsequently viewed as successful and 
that deviation often preceded adverse macroeconomic outcomes, the Rule came 
to have normative weight.43 That the Taylor Rule appeared to be 
 
 38.  Mishkin, Lessons from the Crisis, supra note 9, at 7; see also Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy 
Rules, supra note 14, at 199–202.  
 39.  See Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules, supra note 14.  
 40.  Id.at 204, Fig. 1.  
 41.  John Judd & Glenn D. Rudebusch, FRBSF Econ. Letter No. 1998-38: Describing Fed 
Behavior (Dec. 25, 1998), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/1998/ 
december/describing-fed-behavior/. In Taylor’s assessment, Greenspan kept rates too low for too long 
from 2003 through 2005. John B. Taylor, Keynote Address at the Financial Markets Conference 
“Maintaining Financial Stability: Holding a Tiger by the Tail”: Simple Rules for Financial Stability 7 
(April 9, 2013), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/ 
13fmc_taylor_pres.pdf.  
 42.  Richard Clarida et al., Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and 
Some Theory 151 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6442, 1998), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6442.pdf?new_window=1 (examining the Fed’s monetary policy during 
the 1960s through the 1970s by reference to the Taylor Rule).  
 43.  E.g., What is Taylor’s Rule?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (Mar. 1998), http://www.frbsf.org/ 
education/publications/doctor-econ/1998/march/taylor-rule-monetary-policy (noting that “many 
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straightforward and was proposed at a period when central banks were seeking 
to enhance the public’s perception of their legitimacy, a goal furthered by rule-
like principled norms, may further help to explain its quick rise to prominence 
as a principled norm.44 
Consistent with Taylor’s aspirations, the Rule has come to shape policy in 
addition to informing debates about the same. As explained by George Kahn: 
“The Taylor Rule has revolutionized the way many policymakers at central 
banks think about monetary policy.”45 Examining “[s]peeches by policymakers 
and transcripts and minutes of policy meetings,” Kahn’s analysis suggests that 
“the Taylor rule became integrated into policy discussions and, in some cases, 
the policy framework itself.”46 To be sure, the Rule has never been formally 
adopted as a policy to which the Fed must adhere, and the Fed has often set the 
fed funds rate at levels that deviate from that which the rule would prescribe.47 
Nonetheless, both proponents and opponents of the Fed’s policies often frame 
their positions by reference to the Taylor Rule, reflecting its influence.48 
Moreover, members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) know 
that the Taylor Rule will be among the tools used to assess the legitimacy and 
correctness of their actions. This gives them a reason to adhere to it apart from 
its merits. Although it is impossible to determine the degree to which a person’s 
statements about the reasons for his actions accurately reflect his underlying 
rationale, the frequency with which the Rule is invoked by Fed policymakers 
and other commentators suggests it has come to play a meaningful role shaping 
the Fed’s interest-rate policies.49 
Like the real bills doctrine, it also appears that the Taylor Rule serves a 
second function of complementing traditional tools of accountability. One 
challenge impeding public discourse about monetary policy is that the fed funds 
rate, standing alone, provides limited insight into whether the rate is 
accommodative or restrictive, and the likely effects of setting the rate at a 
particular level.50 This is one of many reasons that experts have long dominated 
debates about monetary policy. By contrast, whether a rate is above or below 
 
economists inside and outside of the Fed [have cited the close correlation between the Fed funds rate 
the Taylor Rule would prescribe and the actual Fed funds rate under Greenspan as] a reason that 
inflation has remained under control and that the economy has been relatively stable in the US over the 
past ten years”); Mishkin, Lessons from the Crisis, supra note 9, at 3 (identifying the Taylor Principle as 
one of the core “elements of what has been dubbed the new neoclassical synthesis[, which] were agreed 
to by almost all academic economists and central bankers” prior to the Crisis).  
 44.  George A. Kahn, The Taylor Rule and the Practice of Central Banking, in THE TAYLOR RULE 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MONETARY POLICY 63, 68–70 (Evan F. Koenig et. al., eds., 2012). 
 45.  Id. at 63. 
 46.  Id. at 65. 
 47.  E.g., Kahn, supra note 44, at 84. 
 48.  See, e.g., id.; Clarida et al., supra note 42, at 5, 13; Judd & Rudebusch, supra note 41. 
 49.  See, e.g., id. at 73 (noting that “it is clear from the transcripts that the Taylor rule became a key 
input into the FOMC’s policy process”).  
 50.  Another factor inhibiting an effective response to the Depression was the Fed’s own tendency 
to focus on nominal, rather than effective, interest rates. Calomiris, supra note 18, at 14.  
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that which the Taylor Rule dictates under the circumstances provides 
meaningful information in this regard.51 The Taylor Rule thus facilitates 
oversight and informed discussion, important prerequisites for effective 
accountability.52 
The analysis thus far suffices to establish the two points critical to the 
argument here: the Taylor Rule appears to shape Fed action and to facilitate 
informed discussions about the same. Yet, to better understand the value of 
principled norms and limitations on them, two final points merit mention. First, 
the Rule is not quite as rule-like as the name suggests. Taylor clearly intended 
the Rule to function as a rule that could be cleanly applied to any situation. 
Much of the article proposing the Rule focused not on the Rule itself, but on 
the value of having clean rules for monetary policy.53 As Taylor explained, he 
and other economists believed that having a central bank follow such rules was 
better than giving policymakers complete discretion for a number of reasons, 
including the time-inconsistency problem and the expectation that rules would 
increase credibility and, along with it, efficacy.54 In his view, any policy rule 
should evolve over time, should be among the factors that the FOMC (the 
committee that determines the fed funds rate) routinely consults in making 
decisions though not dictating a particular outcome, and should be adhered to 
for a sufficiently long period of time to facilitate learning and to meaningfully 
restrain discretion, but need not persist indefinitely.55 Taylor thus assumed that 
principled norms could and should meaningfully shape Fed action, and he 
provided helpful guidelines with regard to their operation.56 
Yet the Taylor Rule itself has not provided as clean of a guideline as Taylor 
had hoped. For example, Taylor and others have used the Taylor Rule to 
suggest that the Fed’s policies were overly accommodative in the years prior to 
 
 51.  For example, a number of analyses suggest that the Fed, the central banks of most 
industrialized nations, and the central banks of many emerging economies had interest-rate policies 
that were consistently more accommodative than the Taylor Rule would dictate since 2003. Boris 
Hofmann & Bilyana Bogdanova, Taylor Rules and Monetary Policy: A Global “Great Deviation”?, 
2012 BIS Q. REV. 37, 41 Graph 1. 
 52.  See, e.g., Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the 
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley: Revolution and Evolution in Central Bank 
Communications, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20121113a.htm 
and accompanying slideshow (using a modified Taylor Rule as primary reference point in explaining 
the FOMC’s approach to setting the fed funds rate).  
 53.  See Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules, supra note 14. 
 54.  Id. at 196. 
 55.  Id. at 203–10. 
 56.  Taylor’s analysis of the importance and drawbacks of policy rules, and the appropriate 
contours of such rules, has been nearly as influential as the specific rule that he proposed, and has 
facilitated the development of other principled norms for guiding monetary policy over the last two 
decades. See, e.g., Donald L. Kohn, Former Vice-Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Conference on John Taylor's Contributions to Monetary Theory and 
Policy: John Taylor Rules (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/kohn20071012a.htm (describing the benefits and drawbacks of such rules and Taylor’s role in 
promoting their development).  
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the Crisis and thus were a significant factor contributing to the Crisis.57 
Reflecting his awareness of the importance of the Taylor Rule, Chairman 
Bernanke has sought to rebut these claims.58 Rather than arguing against the 
value of the Rule, however, he has formulated his rebuttal in a way that 
reaffirms its importance. More specifically, he has highlighted that the rate the 
Taylor Rule dictates depends on the inputs one uses and that jiggering one 
assumption underlying the traditional formulation in a seemingly justifiable way 
produces a modified version of the Taylor Rule that tracks rather closely the 
Fed’s policies during the relevant period.59 
The capacity of the Taylor Rule to be modified in this way may help to 
support its utility and resilience, allowing it to evolve to accommodate learning 
and changed circumstances; however, this flexibility also alters its role in 
constraining policy action and shaping debate about the same. As the room for 
disagreement increases, the capacity of the Taylor Rule to constrain action and 
identify deviations declines.60 Relatedly, the debate becomes more specialized, 
as participants must now be sufficiently informed to evaluate claims about the 
inputs and assumptions used before they can assess the significance of an action 
that appears to deviate from the Rule. This raises the possibility that principled 
norms may be making the Fed more accountable to experts than the public 
generally. 
Also noteworthy is how the rise of the Taylor Rule impacted the reputation 
and influence of John Taylor. As noted, Taylor has been a critic of the Fed’s 
recent policies and has advocated for the adoption of more-clear standards for 
monetary policy.61 Taylor has also been able to reach public audiences through, 
for example, opinion pieces in major publications on topics outside the scope of 
the Taylor Rule.62 Although he is not alone among academics in this regard, the 
influence of the Taylor Rule likely enhances his relative stature from the 
 
 57.  Hofmann & Bogdanova, supra note 51, at 37 and sources cited therein. See also John B. 
Taylor, Housing and Monetary Policy 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13682, 
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13682.pdf?new_window=1.  
 58.  Jon Hilsenrath, Bernanke, Taylor Rules and the Fed Funds Rate, WALL ST. J. ECON. BLOG 
(Jan. 11, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/01/11/bernanke-taylor-rules-and-the-fed-
funds-rate/.  
 59.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association: Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble (Jan. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm; see also, e.g., Alan S. 
Blinder, An Unnecessary Fix for the Fed, WALL ST. J., Jul. 18, 2014, at A11 (noting that “hundreds of 
‘Taylor rules’ have been considered over the years”).  
 60.  See infra Part I.A.C. for a further discussion of the tensions that arise from the flexibility 
inherent in a principled norm.  
 61.  John B. Taylor, Keynote Address at the Financial Markets Conference, supra note 41, at 8 
(calling for “[a] return to a conventional rules-based monetary policy as we had in the 1980s, the 1990s, 
and until recently”). 
 62.  E.g., John B. Taylor, The Economic Hokum of ‘Secular Stagnation,’ WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2014, 
at A17; John B. Taylor, The Weak Recovery Explains Rising Inequality, Not Vice Versa, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 10, 2013, at A17; John B. Taylor, How the Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 9, 2009, at A19.  
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perspective of the informed public, increasing his influence and opportunities to 
be heard.63 This is relevant to the analysis here in two ways. First, it highlights a 
potentially significant reward for economists and others to formulate influential 
principled norms, facilitating their creation. Second, it may further enhance 
oversight and discourse by providing a platform for an outside expert to be 
heard.64 
3. Bagehot’s Dictum 
The final principled norm this paper examines is a series of admonitions by 
Walter Bagehot, editor of The Economist during the late nineteenth century, 
regarding the role that a central bank should play during a systemic liquidity 
shortage. Walter Bagehot was not a trained economist, but rather a journalist 
and essayist who wrote about government, economics, literature, and other 
topics.65 In Lombard Street, published in 1873, he analyzed the Bank of 
England’s response to a recent financial crisis and provided his view of the 
appropriate role that a lender of last resort should play in responding to such a 
crisis.66 Among other admonitions, he claimed that when significant liquidity 
shortfalls plague the market, a central bank should step in and provide liquidity 
by lending freely against any collateral that had been considered good collateral 
prior to the crisis.67 At the same time, to discourage excessive reliance on the 
lender of last resort, he argued that the rate of interest charged on such loans 
should be a penalty rate (that is, a rate well above that being charged just prior 
to the crisis)68 and the lender of last resort should lend only to those with 
adequate collateral.69 These maxims have come to be known, collectively, as 
 
 63.  Perhaps the strongest evidence of his perceived influence is the way other public 
commentators have used him as a target. New York Times columnist and esteemed economist Paul 
Krugman, for example, recently published a short piece almost exclusively about two seemingly 
inconsistent positions by Taylor—both having little to do with the Taylor Rule—reflecting Krugman’s 
perception of his influence or the capacity of Taylor’s name to attract readers. Paul Krugman, Taylor’s 
Rule on Fiscal Policy, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (June 16, 2013, 8:13 AM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/taylors-rule-on-fiscal-policy/.   
 64.  Cf. Dahlia Lithwick, The Souter Factor, SLATE (Aug. 3, 2005, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/08/the_souter_factor.html (defining 
“Greenhouse Effect” as “a phenomenon popularized by D.C. Appeals Court Judge Laurence 
Silberman referring to federal judges whose rulings are guided solely by their need for adulation from 
legal reporters such as Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times”).   
 65.  Walter Bagehot, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA ONLINE ACAD. EDITION, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/48750/Walter-Bagehot (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
 66.  Today, Fed officials tend to view the monetary policy and lender of last resort activity as 
fundamentally distinct. Mark A. Carlson & David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons 
from the Fed’s First 100 Years 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-056B, 2012), 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-056.pdf. This was not the case in Bagehot’s time, 
and, examined in context, his dictum also has monetary policy implications. Given that his dictum 
clearly addresses the role of a lender of last resort and others have viewed his dictum solely as relevant 
to such activity, this article does not explore this issue. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.  
 67.  WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 56 
(1873). 
 68.  Id. at 57. 
 69.  This requirement has been interpreted by some to mean that central banks should lend only to 
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Bagehot’s dictum. 
During the recent Crisis, Bagehot’s name and this simplified version of his 
dictum were invoked with great frequency by members of the Fed and outside 
commentators. For example, in a series of four speeches Chairman Ben 
Bernanke delivered to explain the Crisis and the Fed’s response to it, Bernanke 
repeatedly invoked the principled norms set forth in Bagehot’s dictum to 
explain what central banks should do during a financial crisis and what the Fed 
actually did.70 Other Fed officials and the heads of foreign central banks 
similarly employed Bagehot’s dictum as the reference point for explaining the 
legitimacy of their actions.71 Just as significantly, Bagehot’s dictum was regularly 
invoked in debates about the Fed’s Crisis-era policies. For example, during the 
2009 Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, an annual meeting attended 
by Fed officials, officials from other central banks, and other esteemed experts, 
Bagehot’s name was invoked forty-eight times.72 These indicia suggest that 
Bagehot’s dictum functioned as a principled norm during the Crisis: it appears 
to have both influenced Fed policies and served as a reference point shaping 
discussions about the same. 
In addition to illustrating these two functions of principled norms, the 
influence of Bagehot’s dictum also sheds additional light on the processes 
through which such norms gain influence and the role that regulators 
themselves can play in that process. Based upon the frequency with which 
Bagehot’s dictum has been invoked in recent years, one might think that it had 
been influential in shaping Fed policy throughout its history. A brief look at 
that history suggests otherwise. For example, while some senior Fed officials 
referenced Bagehot’s work during the period leading into the Great 
Depression, “they did not follow his advice.”73 Moreover, even following the 
Great Depression, the policy that the Fed adopted to govern its lender of last 
resort activity directly contravened Bagehot’s admonition.74 It was not until 
 
solvent institutions. E.g., Brian F. Madigan, Dir. Div. of Monetary Affairs, Speech at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Bagehot’s Dictum in Practice: 
Formulating and Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821a.htm.  
 70.  BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LECTURES BY 
BEN S. BERNANKE 7 (2013) (providing transcripts of the four lectures Bernanke presented at George 
Washington University on the role of the Federal Reserve in the economy).  
 71.  See, e.g., NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON 
FIRE 10 (2013) [hereinafter IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS] (noting that Trichet (the head of the European 
Central Bank), Bernanke, and King (the head of the U.K.’s central bank) “often invoked Bagehot’s 
words as a model for their own crisis response almost 150 years” after he wrote); Brian F. Madigan, 
supra note 69.  
 72.  IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS, supra note 71, at 28.  
 73.  Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 729. 
 74.  Rather than employing a penalty rate, the Fed set the discount rate below prevailing market 
rates. And, rather than lending freely to anyone with good collateral, the Fed lent only to banks, 
requiring the banks to demonstrate that they could not meet their funding needs in the market before 
becoming eligible to borrow. Olivier Armantier et al., Stigma in Financial Markets: Evidence from 
Liquidity Auctions and Discount Window Borrowing During the Crisis 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Staff Report No. 483, 2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr483.pdf.  
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2003 that the Fed modified its policies to better align with the dictum, but even 
the revised policies deviated in some significant ways.75 To be sure, Bagehot’s 
dictum has played a continuing role in academic discussions about why we have 
a lender of last resort and the role such an institution should play.76 It was thus 
well positioned to be among the principled norms that influenced policymaking 
during the Crisis. Nonetheless, given the policy history, its influence could not 
have been assumed. Examining why Bagehot’s dictum was so influential in 
recent years thus sheds light on how an idea rises to the level of functioning as a 
principled norm. 
A number of possible explanations for the influence of Bagehot’s dictum 
during the Crisis fail to hold up under scrutiny. Its influence, for example, 
cannot be attributed to the similarity between the situation that the Fed faced 
during the Crisis and that which motivated Bagehot’s writing. Financial markets 
have evolved dramatically since Bagehot’s time, and a range of financial and 
regulatory innovations arguably weaken the need for a central bank today to 
function in the manner Bagehot envisioned.77 Moreover, there has been a 
significant amount of learning about the effects of different central bank 
policies in the nearly century and a half since Bagehot authored his treatise. As 
Allan Meltzer explains, “neither Bagehot nor those who followed his lead 
attempted to combine the theory of central banking or monetary policy with 
what is now called macroeconomic theory.”78 These topics have been the subject 
of significant, and often quite rigorous, academic analysis in the intervening 
period, and those analyses have had the benefit of numerous additional data 
points (in the form of additional financial crises across a wide variety of 
settings) to assess the efficacy of different policy responses.79 Additionally, in 
contrast to the time when Bagehot was writing, discounting is not the primary 
tool through which the Fed (or any central bank) influences monetary supply, 
further attenuating Bagehot’s dictum and the challenges facing the Fed during 
 
 75.  Id. (imposing a penalty rate but continuing to limit the collateral it would accept and 
restricting access to banks).  
 76.  E.g., Carlson & Wheelock, supra note 66, at 36 (all using Bagehot’s dictum as reference point 
of a sort); Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central 
Banking (excerpts), in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 145 
(Charles Goodhard & Gerhard Illing, eds., 2002); Charles Goodhard & Gerhard Illing, Introduction, in 
FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 1 (Charles Goodhard & 
Gerhard Illing, eds., 2002); Fred Hirsch, The Bagehot Problem, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, 
AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 187 (Charles Goodhard & Gerhard Illing, eds., 2002).   
 77.  E.g., Gara Afonso et al., Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial 
Crisis, 66 J. FIN. 1109, 1113 (2011); Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the 
Literature, 7 FIN. STABILITY REV. 151, 153 (1999); Kathryn Judge, Thirteen Months: The Role of a 
Modern Lender of Last Resort (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 78.  Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 20.  
 79.  See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?, 18 
FIN. STABILITY REV. 63, 64–70 (2000) (noting several studies and empirical analysis conducted on 
previous banking crises and bank runs to address cases of emergency lending by central banks to 
illiquid but solvent institutions).  
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the Crisis.80 
The question of why Bagehot’s dictum was invoked with such frequency by 
the Fed, other central banks, and commentators assessing the appropriateness 
of the Fed’s actions thus remains. Even though his dictum may have had some 
persistent influence since it was first espoused, it was only during the Crisis that 
its influence and pervasiveness seem to have risen to the level of a principled 
norm. One possibility is that the very uniqueness of the actions being taken 
invited scrutiny. Aware that it was doing something unusual, but wanting 
support for its actions and seeking to deflect attention away from the 
unprecedented nature of the actions it was taking, Fed officials may have 
looked for a norm that had sufficiently deep roots to give an impression of 
legitimacy yet was sufficiently flexible to be relevant. Bagehot’s dictum satisfies 
both requirements. Commentators on the Fed similarly were grappling for 
reference points as they attempted to analyze the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of the Fed’s actions. Invoking Bagehot’s dictum thus gave their 
work an air of legitimacy, thereby allowing them to say something more 
authoritative than “It looks like a good move to me,” or “Seems a little 
troubling, but in light of the unprecedented nature of all that is happening, it’s 
hard to know why.” 
In other words, the Fed, other central banks, academics, and other 
commentators shared a common interest in establishing the legitimacy of their 
respective work. Invoking Bagehot’s dictum served this end for each group, 
albeit in slightly different ways. And the more frequently it was invoked, the 
greater legitimacy it came to possess, and the greater legitimacy its use could 
confer. Hence, there may have been a self-perpetuating cycle through which the 
status of the dictum evolved to become the primary reference point against 
which lender-of-last-resort activity was assessed. 
Other considerations support the notion that the frequency with which 
Bagehot was invoked reflects an effort to establish legitimacy and not just 
earnest accounting of the sources of wisdom shaping the Fed’s policymaking. It 
is notable, for example, that Bagehot’s dictum provides cover for one of the 
most controversial aspects of the Fed’s actions during the Crisis—its extensive 
lending to nonbank institutions—and was invoked by Fed policymakers to 
justify these actions.81 At the same time, other aspects of the Fed’s actions did 
not neatly conform to his dictum, as one would expect if it were functioning 
primarily as a guide.82 The point here is not to assess whether the Fed’s actions 
 
 80.  See Meltzer, Volume 1, supra note 21, at 740–42 (describing the relative decline of 
rediscounting and the correspondent rise of open market operations).  
 81.  E.g., Brian Madigan, supra note 69 (claiming that the “recent financial crisis provides 
considerable evidence in support of what Bagehot knew more than 135 years ago . . . . To cushion the 
adverse effects of a financial panic on economic activity, a central bank must be ready to lend freely, 
potentially to a broad range of counterparties”). 
 82.  Id. (suggesting that “Bagehot's precepts need to be interpreted and applied in light of practical 
considerations, . . . that application is not necessarily straightforward,” and explaining why it justifies 
the Fed’s failure to adhere fully to other elements of the dictum). 
JUDGE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2015  12:08 PM 
82 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:65 
conformed to Bagehot’s dictum or whether they were justified as a matter of 
policy, but to highlight that the facts do not support the notion that the Fed was 
merely following a clear and long-established principle. 
This examination of Bagehot’s dictum and its role as a principled norm 
during the Crisis has important implications for its utility as a means of 
enhancing accountability. The frequency with which Bagehot was invoked 
seems likely to be, at least in part, a byproduct of a desire among those invoking 
his dictum to establish the legitimacy of their claims or actions, and Fed officials 
appear to have been among those invoking it for this purpose. This may well 
have shaped subsequent Fed action—as the more frequently the dictum was 
invoked, the more normative weight it came to carry—but it does suggest that 
Fed officials may have been using the dictum to deflect scrutiny, an aim not 
entirely consistent with promoting political accountability.83 
Additionally, the dictum’s ongoing influence and the way it has been 
interpreted to fit various contexts reaffirm a challenge noted in connection with 
the Taylor Rule. Given the dynamism of financial markets and ongoing 
learning, the most resilient principled norms are likely to be those that are 
sufficiently flexible that they can be translated to accommodate changed 
circumstances and new insights.84 Yet, the process of translating a principled 
norm in light of such developments may compromise its capacity to constrain 
action. Excessive wiggle room may gut a principled norm of any force or 
meaning. And, even if the wiggle room is constrained by the need to justify the 
modifications, that process is likely to require expertise, thereby making Fed 
policymakers more accountable to experts without necessarily making them 
equally accountable to the public or elected representatives.85 
B. Reputation 
The second soft constraint this article examines is the reputation of the Fed 
Chair. Reputational considerations have been invoked in a wide variety of 
 
 83.  See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial 
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2002–03 (2014) (suggesting that a compilation of 
speeches published by Ben Bernanke about the Crisis in which Bernanke regularly invokes Bagehot to 
explain the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort activities mounts a “defense of the Fed . . . based on showing that 
the Fed was technocratically masterful,” but challenging whether the Bernanke succeeds in that regard, 
highlighting accountability and transparency deficiencies inherent in the Fed’s approach to its lender-
of-last-resort activities and noting that “Bernanke seems oblivious to these shortcomings”). 
 84.  For a thoughtful analysis of some advantages of principled norms that do not act as “ironclad 
rules,” see Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for 
Monetary Policy? 9–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5893, 1997) (discussing 
the importance of this distinction in the context of inflation targeting). 
 85.  The related questions of the optimal amount of flexibility and the mechanisms through which a 
principle is enforced are important and challenging issues and may favor having principled norms 
enforced through informal rather than formal mechanisms even when the latter may seem viable. See, 
e.g., Blinder, supra note 59, at A11. For a thoughtful discussion of these challenges through the lens of 
assessing how best to implement cost-benefit analyses of financial regulation, see John C. Coates, IV, 
Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory Management, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 1.  
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contexts, including discussions of agency structure to shed light on incentives 
and actions.86 Reputational constraints also operate at numerous levels, and an 
individual working for the Fed may have numerous and conflicting reputational 
agendas. As a member of the Fed, she may seek to ensure that the Fed has a 
“good” reputation and may also seek to promote the Fed’s reputation for 
specific characteristics, like credibility. She may also have individual aims, like 
cultivating a reputation that will enhance her capacity to obtain a high-paying 
job if and when she leaves the Fed.87 
These various reputational forces may have correspondingly mixed effects 
on the nature and quality of Fed actions. All of these forces are soft constraints 
and therefore merit consideration in any comprehensive examination of the Fed 
and its accountability. This article nonetheless focuses exclusively on the Fed 
Chair and her individual incentives. It does so in part to make its analysis 
tractable, but also because the Fed Chair appears to exercise significant 
influence over Fed action, suggesting that her incentives will play a significant 
role in shaping Fed action.88 
Fourteen men and one woman have chaired the Fed since it was founded in 
1914. In the decades since the Depression, the majority of Chairs have served 
for relatively long terms.89 Through a number of mechanisms, the Chair is often 
 
 86.  See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 333, 334 (Daniel A. Farber et. al., eds., 2010) [hereinafter Gersen, Designing Agencies] 
(referring to William Niskanen’s 1971 study, which found that bureaucrats maximize “some mix of 
salary, perks, reputation, power, and flexibility,” and stating that James Q. Wilson echoed this 
sentiment in 1989); Bressman & Thompson, supra note 6, at 635 (noting that the public’s evaluation of 
the health of the economy can translate into reputational or approval ratings for the Fed and the 
President).  
 87.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Financial 
Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 102–07.  
 88.  E.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 7, at 42 (stating that there is an “equation of the Chair[man of 
the Board] with the Fed” which has led some to conclude that the “‘Fed’s history . . . is largely the 
product of the leadership of its Chairman,’” and providing a variety of forms of evidence to support the 
conjecture) (quoting DONALD KETTL, LEADERSHIP AT THE FED xi (1988)); IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS, 
supra note 71, at 266 (noting that “even though the Fed chairman has only one vote out of twelve, his 
true power goes far beyond that” as “[h]e sets the agenda and frames the options on the table” allowing 
him to “guide[] the discussion toward directions he believes useful and away from those he disfavors”). 
Another advantage of focusing on the Chair is that doing so is consistent with a recent trend in the 
literature on reputation—focusing on the individual, rather than the entity for which he works, as the 
appropriate level for analyzing how reputational concerns shape action. JONATHAN MACEY, THE 
DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 
1–2 (2013); Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Trust, Reputation and Law: The Evolution of 
Commitment in Investment Banking 28–31 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished draft), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/Morrison,%20A%20-
%20Spring%20%202013%20BS.pdf. See also Jon Hilsenrath & Kristina Peterson, Federal Reserve 
‘Doves’ Beat ‘Hawks’ in Economic Prognosticating: Slow Growth, Low Inflation Give Yellen, Dudley 
Upper Hand on Forecasts, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2013, at A1 (empirically assessing the accuracy of 
statements by individual Fed officials regarding their expectations for future economic activity to assess 
their relative performance).   
 89.  Membership of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1914–Present, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/ 
boardmembership.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (providing the following tenures for Fed Chairs since 
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held accountable and has her reputation shaped by the effects of the Fed’s 
actions during his tenure. For example, at least twice a year, in connection with 
statutorily mandated written reports to Congress on “the conduct of monetary 
policy and economic developments and prospects for the future,” the Fed Chair 
testifies before Congress.90 The Fed Chair is often also called to testify on other 
actions of the Fed, particularly when it takes actions that are unprecedented or 
otherwise unusual.91 There are also numerous academic articles assessing the 
efficacy of Fed policies under particular Fed Chairs,92 as well as academic and 
popular press books highlighting the influence of particular Fed Chairs.93 Most 
recently, the significant influence of Ben Bernanke on the Fed’s action during 
and since the Crisis has been widely touted by the press in addition to being a 
common theme in many books about the Crisis.94 
The evolving reputations of two previous Fed Chairs—Paul Volcker, who 
chaired the Fed from 1979 until 1987, and his successor Alan Greenspan, who 
served until Bernanke was appointed in early 2006—illustrate how these 
assessments are formulated and revised over time. When Volcker took the reins 
in 1979, the economy was suffering from a period of stagflation—high interest 
rates and inflation, low economic growth, and relatively high unemployment.95 
Under Volcker, the Fed responded by dramatically increasing the fed funds 
rate, which had the foreseeable effect of driving up interest rates and increasing 
unemployment.96 Unsurprisingly, the immediate public response was powerful 
 
1934: Marriner Eccles, 1934–1948; Thomas B. McCabe, 1948–1951; William McChesney Martin Jr., 
1951–1970; Arthur Burns, 1970–1978; William Miller, 1978–1979; Paul Volcker, 1979–1987; Alan 
Greenspan, 1987–2006; Ben Bernanke, 2006–2014; Janet Yellen, 2014–present).  
 90.  12 U.S.C. § 225b (2010). For further information, see Monetary Policy Report, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ 
mpr_default.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
 91.  E.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony Before the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate: Developments in the financial markets (Apr. 3, 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080403a.htm; Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony Before the Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives: Private-sector refinancing of the large hedge fund, Long-Term 
Capital Management (Oct. 1, 1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/ 
1998/19981001.htm.  
 92.  E.g., Henry W. Chappell Jr., Rob Roy McGregor & Todd Vermilyea, Majority Rule, 
Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC, 36 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 407 (2004); David R. Hakes, The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy 
under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 327 (1990); Peter G. 
Vanderhart, The Federal Reserve's Reaction Function under Greenspan: An Ordinal Probit Analysis, 22 
J. MACROECONOMICS 631 (2000). 
 93.  E.g., LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 
(2009); IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS, supra note 71; DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN 
BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2010).  
 94.  Id. See also Christopher Matthews, 3 Ways Ben Bernanke Revolutionized the Fed, TIME MAG. 
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/11/20/3-ways-ben-bernanke-revolutionized-the-fed/; 
Victor Li, The Right Man at the Right Time, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/08/19/federal-reserve-chairman-ben-bernankes-legacy-
right-man-right-time.  
 95.  IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS, supra note 71, at 67.  
 96.  Id. at 70. 
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and negative.97 Nonetheless, the policies achieved their intended aim of reining 
in inflation and ultimately restoring a healthy economy.98 As a result, with the 
benefit of hindsight, few characterized his tenure in anything less than glowing 
terms.99 His reputation and influence have grown accordingly. 
Greenspan, by contrast, was revered during his tenure, as the economy 
generally thrived and financial crises were averted even in the wake of events 
that may have precipitated them.100 Since the Crisis, however, his reputation has 
suffered a significant hit.101 The Fed’s low-interest-rate policies during the early 
to mid-2000s have been cited as a key factor contributing to the housing bubble 
that followed, and Greenspan’s faith in market forces to produce socially 
desirable outcomes, a faith reflected in a range of policies that the Fed both 
adopted and failed to adopt during his reign, is now viewed by many as 
fundamentally flawed.102 
As these contrasting accounts reflect, the monetary and other policies 
implemented by the Fed often have very different short-term and long-term 
consequences. This is a primary factor complicating the use of more-traditional 
mechanisms of promoting accountability.103 It also complicates the operation of 
reputational constraints. To the extent a Chair chooses to prioritize his short-
term reputation or influence, he may seek to further policies that are contrary 
to the public’s long-term welfare. Yet Fed Chairs are quite aware of the 
differences between the short- and long-term effects of the policies that the Fed 
promulgates, and they are aware that their legacy depends on the long-term 
effects of their actions. To the extent a Chair opts to prioritize his legacy, 
reputation maps well onto the primary rationale for central bank independence 
and may serve as an effective tool for promoting the adoption of policies that 
yield long-term, socially desirable outcomes. 
This does not mean that reputational constraints alone are a panacea. As 
reflected in the criticisms of some of the Fed’s policies under Greenspan, the 
Fed clearly has adopted policies that are now viewed as having been contrary to 
the public interest.104 This could indicate that Greenspan prioritized the short-
 
 97.  Id. (noting that during the early part of his tenure, Volcker’s policies made him “one of the 
most unpopular people in the country”).  
 98.  Id. at 71. 
 99.  Martin Hutchinson, To Treat the Fed as Volcker Did, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B2 
(describing the “1979–87 chairmanship of Paul Volcker” as one of the Fed’s “few moments of glory,” as 
a result of the Fed successfully “bringing inflation under control, providing a sound store of value for 
the United States economy”). 
 100.  E.g., IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS, supra note 71, at 54–55 (describing 2005 Jackson Hole 
conference celebrating Greenspan’s tenure and the adulation lathered upon him).  
 101.  Kara Scannel & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 24, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122476545437862295 (noting harsh congressional 
questioning of Grenspan’s actions during the crisis); 25 People to Blame for the Crisis, TIME MAG. 
(Feb. 11, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/ 
0,28804,1877351_1877350_1877331,00.html. 
 102.  POSNER, supra note 10, at 255–57.   
 103.  See infra Part II.C. 
 104.  See, e.g., Scannel & Reddy, supra note 102 (identifying keeping the short term interest rate at 
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term, but it may also reflect that he was mistaken about the effects those 
policies would have. Reputational concerns cannot eliminate mistakes. Another 
challenge is that a Chair’s reputation is usually the product of numerous 
different actions. If a Fed Chair makes a bad policy decision with respect to one 
issue, but the effects of that decision are dwarfed by other actions that have the 
desired effect, that error is unlikely to be penalized through reputational 
checks. As a result, reputation is likely to be less effective than principled norms 
at shaping behavior at a granular level. 
Yet reputational constraints also have some distinct benefits. The types of 
actions that may affect a Fed Chair’s reputation are as diverse as the types of 
policies that the Fed can lawfully pursue. This enables reputational constraints 
to be dynamic, responsive, and forward-looking, attributes that few other 
constraints can replicate. Principled norms, for example, tend to arise over time 
and require inputs and learning. Thus, a novel situation will often lack an 
applicable principled norm or the guidance such a norm provides may be wrong 
when applied under the circumstances.105 By contrast, reputation is always 
present as a constraint. No matter how unprecedented a challenge, a Chair’s 
reputation will depend on whether she responds to it in a way that produces the 
desired outcome. If anything, the more unusual the circumstance, the more 
powerful the feedback loop between the Fed’s actions and the Chair’s long-
term reputation. 
In part because of these considerations, reputation may serve as a 
complement to principled norms. When a Fed Chair adheres to an existing 
norm, the probability of criticism, at least in the short run, is reduced 
substantially. The principled norm, rather than the Chair, receives the bulk of 
the credit or blame for the success of the policy pursued. By contrast, the more 
willing a Fed Chair is to deviate from an established norm, the more the policy 
pursued will be attributable to her. In the short term, deviation invites scrutiny. 
In the long run, the success of such policies can be the cornerstone of a Fed 
Chair’s reputation. For example, in their critique of the Fed’s overly rigid 
adherence to the real bills doctrine, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz 
suggest that Benjamin Strong demonstrated a willingness to deviate from the 
doctrine when circumstances warranted and, had Strong lived, the Fed may 
have more successfully combatted the greatest depths of the Depression.106 
While others have questioned Friedman and Schwartz’s analysis, it remains 
influential and illustrates the ways that reputational concerns may facilitate 
deviation from a principled norm. 
 
1% to spur home buying, employing a “hands-off regulatory philosophy,” and advocating the use of 
risky and unregulated credit default swaps as crucial policy mistakes of the Fed under Greenspan’s 
tenure). 
 105.  See supra Part I.A.3.  
 106.  Other academics have subsequently claimed that Strong’s supposed deviations were actually 
consistent with the real bills doctrine. Calomiris, supra note 17, at 13 (arguing that Strong’s “supposed 
exceptions to real bills targeting . . . were not really exceptions, since [they] occurred at times of high 
borrowed reserves”).   
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The analysis here suggests that reputational concerns may promote or 
inhibit a Chair’s tendency to adhere to a principled norm. A Chair whose 
primary aim is to minimize short-term scrutiny will tend to comply. Similarly, 
when a Chair is conservative in the sense of preferring to avoid lionization or 
demonization, reputational concerns will tend to increase the probability that 
the Chair will use her influence in support of policies that conform to principled 
norms then in effect. By contrast, a Fed Chair who is concerned primarily with 
her long-term reputation is incented to deviate when she believes a principled 
norm is wrong or not applicable. 
Another important relationship between these two soft constraints is that 
each relies upon outsiders—popular commentators, academics, Congress, and 
others—in order to be effective. With respect to principled norms, outsiders 
play two critical roles—first in the development and evolution of the norm, and 
second in assessing whether the Fed’s actions comply with the norm.107 
Similarly, part of the reason that Fed Chairs have reason to worry about their 
reputation is that the success of monetary and other policies promulgated under 
their oversight are subject to scrutiny by academics and others for years to 
come. 
Collectively, this analysis suggests that reputation may help to address 
concerns about the Fed’s legitimacy through multiple mechanisms. The two 
overarching dynamics of note are the capacity of reputation to serve as a partial 
substitute for accountability and its capacity to complement more traditional 
mechanisms for promoting accountability. It functions as a partial substitute by 
increasing the probability that it will act in ways that further the public interest 
and correspondingly reducing the probability of arbitrary or self-serving action. 
It serves as a complement because one of the best ways for a Fed chair to 
ensure that her actions have the desired effect on her reputation is to explain 
what she is doing and why she is doing it.108 This can improve transparency and 
facilitate oversight. Ultimately, the power of reputation to address concerns 
about the Fed and accountability are likely to depend in part on the reasons we 
care about accountability in the first place. 
III 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Having established that the identified soft constraints play a role shaping 
Fed action, the question becomes: so what? For some, the answer may be the 
same as the question: so what? Even if one accepts the preceding analysis, the 
constraints that it reveals are not only informal but also imperfect. Although 
probabilistically meaningful, none of the identified constraints ensures that the 
Fed will act a certain way in a given set of circumstances. For similar reasons, 
even those who recognize that soft constraints matter may disagree about why. 
 
 107.  See supra Part II.A.2–3. 
 108.  See infra note 119 and accompanying text.  
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These challenges are not unique to this article. As Jerry Mashaw explained, 
accountability often serves as “a placeholder for multiple contemporary 
anxieties.”109 Greater accountability to one constituency can promote or impede 
accountability to others, and the rationales for accountability can vary 
dramatically, as can the ends it is meant to achieve.110 Similar tensions surround 
the notion of independence. 
These challenges are not intractable. Mashaw, for example, has identified 
six related inquiries that allow for a more nuanced analysis of the question of 
accountability and has proposed a partial taxonomy of independence that builds 
upon these inquiries.111 Others have used definitions, sometimes implicit, to 
structure the inquiry.112 Rather than trying to reconcile disparate conversations 
about accountability, this part considers three ways that soft constraints 
contribute to these overlapping debates. It considers, in turn: the capacity of 
soft constraints to mitigate concerns about the Fed’s legitimacy; the value of 
adding soft constraints to the range of factors that academics consider when 
placing an agency along an independence spectrum; and the particular 
importance of soft constraints in settings where more binding constraints are 
excessively costly to employ. Although soft constraints alone are far from a 
solution to the revived concerns about the Fed’s independence and authority, 
the analysis here provides a necessary prerequisite to that discussion, enabling 
all participants to better understand the nature of the accountability challenge 
as it actually exists. 
A. Legitimacy 
Accountability at times serves as a means, rather than as an end, with the 
desired end being to promote good performance. One rationale for making 
boards of directors primarily accountable to shareholders, for example, is that, 
 
 109.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 115 
(Michael Dowdle ed., 2006); see also Adrian Vermeule, The Administrative State: Law, Democracy, and 
Knowledge (Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 13-28, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract+id=2329818, at 11 (describing the “growing body of 
work that complicates ‘accountability’” and its connection to democratic values and identifying as the 
“critical problem . . . that measures that aim to enhance good accountability may also enhance bad 
accountability”).  
 110.  An important issue this article does not address is the mechanisms, both formal and informal, 
through which the Fed is held to account by member banks and how those dynamics affect its 
legitimacy and actions.  
 111.  Mashaw, supra note 109, at 118. 
 112.  See, e.g., Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 6, at 462–64 (noting that, in an attempt 
to “reconcile the administrative state with a constitutional structure that reserves important policy 
decisions for elected officials rather than appointed bureaucrats,” the country has become fixated on 
political accountability, which is seen as a proxy for agency legitimacy); Conti-Brown, supra note 7 
(establishing the Fed’s independence by showing its limited accountability to a range of possible 
constituencies, implicitly assuming that independence means freedom from accountability to any 
identifiable group); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (defining key uses of the term “accountability” in contemporary 
scholarship).  
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as residual claimants, they should incent the board to maximize firm value.113 
Similarly, many of the calls for the Fed to be more accountable are animated by 
concerns that the Fed may use its discretion in troubling ways.114 In this view, 
greater accountability serves as a means of reducing the risk that Fed 
policymakers will use their discretion in arbitrary or self-serving ways. 
Relatedly, much of the debate about the Fed arises from questions of its 
legitimacy, and accountability is not the sole metric determining legitimacy. Lisa 
Bressman, for example, has argued that agency legitimacy depends not only on 
political accountability but also on “the avoidance of arbitrary agency decision-
making.”115 In so doing, she not only suggests flaws with models that place 
excessive weight on presidential control over agency action, but she also 
highlights that it may be appropriate to focus more directly on whether a 
structure promotes good governance.116 
Using Bressman’s definition of arbitrary as “administrative decision-making 
[that] is not rational, predictable, or fair”117 suggests that each of the soft 
constraints identified here, and other soft constraints, will tend to reduce 
arbitrariness. By making it more likely that the Fed will act in accordance with a 
principle that has been vetted by leading experts in the field and promoting 
action that serves the long-term interests of the economy, the identified soft 
constraints incent Fed officials to act in particular and generally beneficial ways. 
In this sense, soft constraints may function as partial substitutes for 
accountability, an alternative mechanism for helping to achieve the desired aim 
of promoting action in the public interest. This may be particularly valuable in 
 
 113.  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the 
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 404 (2001) (noting shareholders are residual claimants in a 
public firm and that contemporary corporate perspectives believe directors should be accountable to 
shareholders for the purpose of maximizing share value); Mashaw, supra note 109, at 89 (stating that if 
the concern is that corporations are “fleecing their shareholders,” the solution is to make them more 
accountable). 
 114.  E.g., PAUL, supra note 3, at 4; Cochrane, supra note 3 (calling for an end to “the system of Fed 
domination”); John B. Taylor, The Dangers of an Interventionist Fed, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2012, at 
A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577307403971824094 
(arguing that the Fed’s discretion is now virtually unlimited and that it should move “move to a less 
interventionist and more rules-based policy of the kind that has worked in the past”).  
 115.  Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 6, at 464. In subsequent work with Robert 
Thompson, Bressman has further explained how certain features of agencies focused on financial 
regulation, including the Fed, may help to address concerns about agency legitimacy and can contribute 
to the debate about independence. This article complements that work, largely by focusing on different 
mechanisms that shape agency action. The analysis here regarding reputation loosely overlaps with 
Bressman and Thompson’s claim that accountability may be less important in certain domains, 
including the promotion of financial stability, because the interests of President and agency are well 
aligned. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 6, at 635. The analysis here differs, however, in that 
reputation is recognized to vary by time period. To the extent that regulations may have short-term 
costs but long-term benefits, a characteristic that will often apply to regulations promoting financial 
stability in addition to matters of monetary policy, reputational concerns may cause the Fed to act in 
ways that are actually contrary to the interests of the current President (a fact Bressman and Thompson 
also acknowledge but do not fully reconcile). Id. at 635–36.  
 116.  Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 6, at 493–503.  
 117.  Id. at 495. 
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the context of the Fed, as at least some commentators have suggested that the 
interests of the President and financial regulators are particularly well aligned.118 
Soft constraints are not a legitimacy panacea, even if one focuses solely on 
this narrow rationale. As reflected in the adverse effects of the Fed’s adherence 
to the real bills doctrine, soft constraints do not always improve the quality of 
the policies that the Fed pursues. Additionally, as reflected in the ways that soft 
constraints can compete with one another, when viewed collectively, they will 
not always render Fed action more predictable. Nonetheless, such situations 
seem likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Principled norms may at 
times be erroneous, but the iterative processes through which they are 
established and discredited, and the myriad voices, including academics, 
regulators, and other policymakers, engaged in those processes, suggest that 
they should often embody current best principles. Similarly, although the 
actions that promote a good reputation in the short run may at times run 
counter to those that promote a long-term glow, concern with reputation will 
tend to promote normatively desirable action. Soft constraints may also reduce 
the likelihood of arbitrary action by increasing the probability that Fed actions 
that fail to prioritize the aims mandated by Congress will be identified, and 
perhaps punished, accordingly. Soft constraints thus seem to play a meaningful, 
even if inherently incomplete, role in helping to establish the Fed’s legitimacy. 
B. Accountability and Independence 
A second implication of the analysis here is that soft constraints should 
likely be among the factors considered in assessing an agency’s independence. 
Traditionally, whether an agency was “independent” was assumed to be a 
binary determination that rested on whether the President had statutory 
authority to remove the head of the agency without cause.119 Yet numerous 
scholars have highlighted ways that this approach is descriptively inaccurate and 
incomplete, if the aim is to have the label correlate to the amount of 
independence an agency actually enjoys in its operations.120 In addition to 
looking beyond removal, scholars have also expanded the analysis to consider 
Congress, as well as the President and the judiciary, when assessing an agency’s 
independence.121 
 
 118.  Bressman & Thompson, supra note 6, at 603, 635. 
 119.  See Barkow, supra note 6, at 16–17; Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing 
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776–77 (2013); Vermeule, 
supra note 6, at 1168–70. 
 120.  Barkow, supra note 6, at 17 (“Threats of removal are not the only way presidents control 
agency heads.”); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (2013) (“As a 
method of exercising control over an agent, removal is simply not all it is cracked up to be.”); 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1176–79. See also Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger B. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political 
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 
SUP. CT. REV. 41, 51; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583–87 (1984).  
 121.  E.g., Barkow, supra note 6, at 42–45, 55–56; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 120, at 
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These moves have spurred some scholars to suggest that the independence 
inquiry should be revised. Rather than a dichotomy, these scholars suggest that 
independence should be viewed along a spectrum, with a range of factors. 
These analyses have also started to identify the factors, such as multimember 
leadership structure, partisan balance requirements, and litigation authority, 
which should be weighed in determining where along that spectrum a particular 
agency falls.122 Notably, however, even these more expansive lists tend to focus 
on formal mechanisms through which members of the three constitutionally 
recognized branches of government can influence agency action. The analysis 
here suggests that if the aim is to develop a more accurate and complete picture 
of the range of factors that influence the amount of independence an agency 
actually enjoys, the inquiry should be expanded further to incorporate the ways 
that soft constraints affect an agency’s operations. 
As an initial matter, the factors suggesting that soft constraints may support 
legitimacy also suggest that soft constraints should be considered when 
assessing an agency’s effective independence. Additionally, soft constraints may 
promote transparency, communication, and understanding. They can thereby 
increase the efficacy of traditional mechanisms for promoting accountability. 
For example, in order to cultivate a good reputation, or to try to mitigate a bad 
one, the chair of an agency must communicate. If her agency takes an action 
that is not popular, reputational concerns make it more likely that she will seek 
to explain, in a way that the public and elected officials can understand, why the 
agency took that action. Bernanke, for example, has expended significant 
efforts trying to explain the actions of the Fed under his watch, and he has done 
so even though he is not seeking reappointment and even though he often had 
no formal obligation to do so.123 Similarly, principled norms can play a critical 
role in facilitating public disclosure of, and discussions about, particular agency 
actions.124 
This does not mean soft constraints are an unmitigated good for those 
seeking to maximize political accountability. Principled norms may be used by 
an agency to deflect attention away from a controversial act and may shift the 
locus of discourse toward a small band of specialists, limiting engagement with 
the public and their elected officials. Similarly, if the Fed Chair is exceptionally 
popular, the President may feel constrained in his capacity to exercise freely his 
power of appointment when the Chair is up for reappointment.125 Such 
 
435; Strauss, supra note 120, at 583. 
 122.  See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 6, at 623; Datla & Revesz, supra note 119, at 774; see 
also Barkow, supra note 6, at 17 (considering, more broadly, factors that can help to “insulat[e] [an 
agency] from interest groups and partisan pressure”).  
 123.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association: The Federal Reserve: Looking Back, Looking Forward (Jan. 3, 2014), available 
at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20140103a.htm. 
 124.  See supra Part II.B. 
 125.  If one considers political accountability as a means to public accountability rather than an end 
in itself, such a shift may be quite welcome. See generally Vermeule, supra note 109 (discussing the 
limitations of using a principal–agent framework to assess agency accountability) 
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situations are likely to be the exception rather than the norm, however, and at 
least some of these examples may not be all that troubling. 
A distinct challenge is that the focus here is on the Fed, and one cannot 
assume that what is true for the Fed applies equally with respect to other 
agencies. The Fed is more powerful and more independent than any other 
federal regulator;126 its chairmen serve for exceptionally long tenures and other 
members of the Fed’s Board of Governors have exceptionally long 
appointments.127 Moreover, it has a unique structure as a result of the important 
(albeit waning) influence of the regional reserve banks in policymaking and 
implementation,128 and there is a robust body of empirical literature supporting 
making central banks independent of elected officials.129 
The difference between the Fed and other federal agencies along these and 
other dimensions is often one of degree rather than kind, but the former can 
sufficiently shape an agency to morph into the latter. As a result, both the types 
of soft constraints that affect an agency’s actions and their relative importance 
may be quite different when the analysis shifts to other agencies. Nonetheless, 
the analysis here suggests that soft constraints can meaningfully impact how an 
agency exercises its discretion and can facilitate other modes of accountability. 
As a result, so long as independence is viewed as a point along a spectrum, with 
its location determined by a range of considerations, soft constraints should be 
among the factors considered in making that determination.130 
C. Context Matters 
Soft constraints, by their nature, tend to be weaker than formal constraints 
on an agency’s authority.131 They may alter Fed action in a way that is 
probabilistically meaningful, but they cannot ensure that the Fed will respond in 
a predetermined way to any particular set of circumstances, and there is limited 
recourse should the Fed’s response deviate from the course that a particular 
soft constraint would seem to require. Yet, it does not follow from this that soft 
constraints are necessarily inferior as tools for promoting accountability. 
Soft constraints could be part of an optimal regime for agency accountability 
in a range of circumstances. Whenever the costs associated with using a soft 
constraint are less than the costs of using a formal constraint for achieving the 
same aim, one might consider the soft constraint to be a superior means for 
achieving the desired aim. Similarly, there may be a range of behaviors that 
 
 126.  Conti-Brown, supra note 7, at i.  
 127.  Id. at 27.  
 128.  Id. at 36. 
 129.  Datla & Revesz, supra note 119, at 825 (analyzing several factors as “indicia of independence” 
of an agency’s independence and ranking the Fed in the group with the second highest number of 
indicia).  
 130.  Id. at 824.  
 131.  Given the Fed’s creativity in how it interpreted its formal authority during the Crisis and the 
capacity of soft constraints to at times be quite powerful, formal constraints cannot be assumed to 
always be more binding than their soft counterparts discussed here.  
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cannot easily be furthered using formal restraints on an agency’s authority, but 
that may be effectively (even if imperfectly) furthered through an appropriate 
soft constraint. Of particular importance, however, is the role of soft constraints 
in settings where accountability is important but formal mechanisms for 
promoting it are problematic. Put differently, the more costly it is to use formal 
constraints to make an agency politically accountable, the greater the relative 
benefits soft constraints may confer. The Fed illustrates this dynamic and the 
exceptional importance of soft constraints in such settings. 
One justification for the existence of independent agencies in general is that 
direct accountability to elected officials can impede regulators’ capacities to 
achieve certain policy aims.132 This commonly arises when the policies required 
to achieve a socially desirable long-term outcome entail significant (or 
particularly salient or unpopular) short-term costs. This tension is vividly 
present in the realm of monetary policy and is a core justification for central 
bank independence. As Ben Bernanke has explained, “monetary policy works 
with lags that can be substantial,” so it is best administered by a body who can 
take a long-term perspective, and “political interference in monetary policy can 
generate undesirable boom–bust cycles.”133 Insulation from political branches 
enables central banks to more credibly commit to maintaining a low rate of 
inflation, and the market’s beliefs regarding such commitments can be self-
fulfilling. There are also longstanding concerns about giving political actors the 
power to create money.134 Because formal mechanisms for enhancing political 
accountability, by their nature, are intended to confer some degree of control 
and increase responsiveness, using such tools to reduce the Fed’s independence 
with respect to monetary policy could have significant and deleterious effects on 
its performance. 
A range of other considerations provide further support for the notion that 
making the Fed more formally accountable to elected officials may not be in the 
best interests of the public. For example, there are concerns that elected 
officials would encourage the Fed to abuse its role as lender of last resort by 
pressuring the Fed to support particular firms or industries to serve political 
 
 132.  E.g., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 6, at 613–14. 
 133.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies International Conference: Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and 
Accountability (May 26, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20100525a.htm; see also Geoffrey P. Miller & Rosa Lastra, Central Bank Independence in 
Ordinary and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 31 (Jan 
Kleiniman, ed., 2000); Alberto Alesina & Lawrence Summers, Central Bank Independence and 
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 151 
(1993), http://www.econ.ucdenver.edu/smith/econ4110/Alesina%20Summers%20-%20Central%20 
Bank%20Independence%20and%20Macro%20Performance.pdf; Frederic S. Mishkin, Central Banking 
After the Crisis, 16 ANN. CONF. OF THE CENT. BANK OF CHILE, Nov. 2012, at 44.  
 134.  E.g., Allan H. Meltzer, Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee: Reforming 
the Federal Reserve for the 21st Century (Sept. 11, 2013), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba19-wstate-ameltzer-20130911.pdf.  
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aims.135 There are also new reasons to expect that short-term accountability may 
inhibit the Fed’s ability to promote financial stability.136 And the incredible 
dynamism of the financial markets is yet another factor favoring granting the 
Fed relatively broad authority and the discretion that comes with it. Although 
giving agencies such discretion shifts the locus of decisionmaking from Congress 
to the agency, in light of the constantly evolving nature of the financial markets, 
a broad grant of authority may be necessary to ensure that the Fed has the tools 
it needs to respond effectively in the face of a crisis.137 
While these considerations help to explain the Fed’s broad authority and 
extreme independence, they do not undermine the importance of ensuring that 
an agency as powerful as the Fed is politically accountable. This is particularly 
true in light of recent events, which clearly illustrate that the Fed’s actions can 
have significant ramifications beyond affecting the health of the overall 
economy.138 For example, the Fed’s actions to stabilize the financial system, 
even if undertaken to promote the overall size of the pie, can also have 
significant distributional consequences. Providing liquidity support to a 
financial institution to prevent the negative externalities that would result from 
its failure inevitably confers benefits on employees, creditors, and other 
stakeholders in a manner that is disproportionate to the social benefits that 
result. Similarly, quantitative easing and other unconventional monetary 
policies may help promote the health of the economy, but they too inevitably 
benefit some segments of the population, like homeowners and other 
borrowers, more than others. These are just a few examples of the difficult 
trade-offs inevitably at stake when the Fed acts. By making such trade-offs 
salient, and by perhaps forcing the Fed to take more actions that 
disproportionately affect identifiable segments of the population, the Crisis 
appropriately renewed longstanding debates about the legitimacy of the Fed. 
 
 135.  See Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window, 74 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS REV. 58, 66 (1992). 
 136.  Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Stability of the Bank of Eng., Speech at the Centre for 
Research on Socio-Cultural Change Annual Conference: Why Institutions Matter (More than Ever) 9 
(Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/ 
speech676.pdf (arguing that “in light of informational and other dynamics, the case for placing financial 
stability policy in the hands of [a policymaker somewhat shielded from electoral accountability] is at 
least as strong, and arguably stronger, than for monetary policy”).  
 137.  Cf. Gersen, Designing Agencies, supra note 86, at 339 (explaining that one way that Congress 
can control agency action is through very detailed grants of authority); McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 
supra note 120, at 440 (same). 
 138.  E.g., Meltzer, Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, supra note 134, at 3. 
(“The current Federal Reserve has engaged in such non-monetary functions as fiscal policy, debt 
management, and credit allocation.”); Lemann, supra note 1. Lemann notes that, 
Since the financial crisis, … people working [at the Fed]… have driven down the value of the 
dollar, infuriating exporting nations such as Brazil and India[,]… have kept interest rates low 
enough to give enormous advantages to debtors, from homeowners to hedge-fund managers 
and private-equity barons, at the expense of people who depend on the interest from their life 
savings[,]… have conferred significant government subsidies on the biggest banks[, and]… are 
helping to push stock prices higher. 
Id. 
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Ultimately, there is no solution to these fundamental tensions, and soft 
constraints certainly do not eliminate them. Nonetheless, soft constraints may 
have a particularly important role to play in helping to mitigate these tensions 
given the drawbacks of using more traditional tools to limit the Fed’s authority 
and independence. Put differently, the relative fuzziness of soft constraints may 
at times be a virtue, enabling them to facilitate oversight, informed discourse, 
and good action while still providing the Fed the independence and discretion it 
needs to make credible commitments and to respond to unforeseen 
developments. 
More generally, the “soft” nature of soft constraints may make them 
particularly useful in settings where the costs of using formal constraints to 
increase political accountability are simply too great to justify their use. The 
ability to “translate” the dictates of a principled norm in light of new 
circumstances, for example, may impede judicial review and make it less 
effective at promoting predictability, but it simultaneously may enable the 
constraint to remain binding even when the Fed is facing challenges for which 
there is no clear precedent. Given the iterative process through which the Fed’s 
authority and independence have grown and evolved over time, it is also quite 
possible that the Fed would not be as independent and powerful as it is today if 
it were not subject to powerful soft constraints on how it uses its authority. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, tensions are inevitable when policymaking authority is 
delegated to an agency run by unelected officials, and the tensions surrounding 
the Fed are particularly great. On the one hand, there is increasing concern 
about the degree of independence that the Fed enjoys, and recent events attest 
to the legitimacy of those concerns. On the other hand, theory and empirical 
literature suggest that the efficacy of monetary policy improves when 
administered by a body that is independent from political branches, and the 
Fed, as it currently exists, remains powerful and very independent. The analysis 
here suggests that soft constraints on the Fed’s authority may provide a 
palliative, reducing the magnitude of the tension even if not resolving it 
completely. It further suggests that soft constraints may be an important 
additional set of factors that should be considered in assessing the effective 
independence of any agency. Although different in kind from more commonly 
recognized tools for enhancing legitimacy, and inherently weaker in some 
regards, soft constraints have the capacity to meaningfully constrain agency 
action and to facilitate oversight and discourse. Operating independently and in 
conjunction with formal tools, the analysis here suggests soft constraints 
sufficiently impact agency action to merit more consideration than they have 
received thus far. 
The analysis here also holds a second lesson for those concerned about the 
Fed’s legitimacy: the importance of continuing to invest in the creation and 
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enforcement of soft constraints. The quality and efficacy of soft constraints 
depends on the effort that academics, the financial press, policymakers, and 
others expend in the processes through which soft constraints are formed and 
enforced. Reputation will only serve as a useful tool for promoting good 
behavior to the extent that the actions of a Fed Chair meaningfully (and 
correctly) inform his subsequent reputation. This requires analysis, and that 
analysis must be regularly revisited and disseminated. 
Similarly, principled norms can constrain only to the extent that there is an 
established principled norm governing how the Fed ought to act in a given 
situation, a condition not satisfied for many actions that the Fed took during the 
Crisis.139 Even then, the value of principled norms depends on their correctness, 
giving rise to the need to regularly reassess such norms in light of new 
information. Thus, while soft constraints have and will continue to play an 
important role enhancing Fed accountability, just how effective they are will 
depend in part on the efforts invested to ensure they remain robust. 
 
 
 139.  For example, the Fed entered into a number of reciprocal currency arrangements with foreign 
central banks pursuant to that appear to have been quite helpful in practice and exposed the Fed to 
minimal credit risk, yet there is no principled norm about when and with whom the Fed should enter 
into such relationships. Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 603, 619–21 (2013); Michael J. Fleming & Nicholas J. Klagge, The Federal Reserve’s Foreign 
Exchange Swap Lines, 16 FED. RES. BANK OF NY CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN., April 2010, 
Issue No. 4. Similarly, in previous work, I have suggested that Bagehot’s dictum, although helpful, is 
too vague on its own to serve as the sole principled norm guiding the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort 
activities. Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 795, 802–05 (2014).   
